Not ready for a demo?
Join us for a live product tour - available every Thursday at 8am PT/11 am ET
Schedule a demo
No, I will lose this chance & potential revenue
x
x

AI coding tools stopped being optional a while ago. DORA's 2025 State of AI-Assisted Software Development report found that 90% of software development professionals had adopted AI tools at work — a 14-point jump year-over-year — with 65% describing themselves as heavily reliant on AI and a median of two hours a day spent on AI-assisted work. Stack Overflow's 2025 survey put overall adoption at 84%, with 51% of professional developers using AI tools daily. GitHub reports its Copilot alone now generates 46% of code written in enabled files, and 90% of Fortune 100 companies have deployed it.
Every one of those developers is now making security-relevant decisions — how a prompt is constructed, what an agent is allowed to touch, how retrieved data is trusted — that no prior training program was ever built to cover. Most enterprises have no baseline for whether their developers can make those decisions safely, because until now there hasn't been a way to certify it.
This isn't a theoretical risk. It shows up consistently across independent research:
The pattern across every study is the same: the more code AI writes, the more a team's real security posture depends on whether the developer directing it knows how to constrain it. Right now, most don't — and most enterprises have no way to verify who does.
Well over half of enterprises still have no formal policy governing AI code usage at all, and a majority of IT leaders report experiencing an AI-related breach in just the past year — while a similar share of organizations are still debating which team should even own AI security. Certification gives enterprises a concrete way to close that gap at the level where the risk actually originates: the developer's daily workflow, not a policy document nobody reads.
Step 1
Step2
Step 3
Trace how an agentic coding tool assembles context, decides to act, and turns a tool call into a file write or shell command — and identifies every trust boundary in that loop. Map the agent's reach across working tree, git history, environment, terminal, network, and CI, and articulate what risk each autonomy level (interactive / auto-accept / autonomous) transfers. Given a repository and workflow, produce a threat model covering indirect prompt injection, hallucinated or squatted dependencies, AI-authored vulnerability patterns, secrets exfiltration, and autonomy escalation.
Signature lab
Compromise your own coding agent — plant an injection payload in a realistic repo artifact, run an ordinary task, and trace where the trust boundary failed.
Convert a feature request into a security-bearing specification carrying authn/authz requirements, data-classification rules, input trust boundaries, secrets handling, and dependency policy. Write abuse cases alongside use cases and encode them as executable acceptance criteria the agent must satisfy. Compare a vibe-coded implementation against a spec-driven one under an identical scanner and review, and defend the security delta.
Signature lab
Build an authenticated file-sharing endpoint twice — vibe-coded vs. spec-driven with abuse cases — and run both through the same gate.
Author layered rules files (project memory, org / repo / task levels) that encode approved crypto, mandatory authorization middleware, logging, and dependency policy. Adversarially test a rules pack — measure how often the agent complies under pressure — and iterate to close gaps, while understanding why instructions alone are only one defense layer.
Signature lab
Build a secure-defaults rules pack, run a battery of adversarial feature requests against it, and harden it.
Enumerate every path a credential takes into and out of an agent — context ingestion, terminal output, git history, MCP config, CI logs — and match each to a closing control. Implement ignore/redaction rules, brokered short-lived credentials, OIDC workload identity, and the secretless pattern; add pre-commit secret scanning and a rotation runbook. Configure permission models, OS-level isolation (containers/microVMs), and ephemeral-branch containment so a compromised agent stays bounded, placing human-in-the-loop where it counts.
Signature lab
Secrets containment drill (leak three ways, close each); sandbox and blast-radius drill.
Write pre-tool-use, pre-commit, and session hooks that block dangerous command patterns, enforce branch protection, and deny unapproved packages and MCP servers. Build a remediation loop that feeds a blocked action and its reason back into the agent's context so it self-corrects, designing guardrails that are fail-closed, tamper-resistant, and centrally distributed.
Signature lab
Build a dual-hook security gate — pre-execution command block plus pre-commit SAST/secret scan with a report fed back to the agent — then try to bypass it.
Decide what to scan at agent-time vs. CI-time; select and tune SAST/SCA/secret/IaC tooling for AI-generated code without poisoning the agent's context with false positives. Verify dependency provenance, catch hallucinated or typosquatted packages, enforce lockfile discipline, and generate an SBOM for AI-assisted builds. Assemble an end-to-end secure agentic pipeline — local hooks → spec → pre-commit scanning → provenance → CI + AI-assisted review — and reason about which layer catches what. Design a 90-day org rollout: repo risk tiers, autonomy per tier, org defaults, an approved tool/MCP/skill registry, and the metrics that prove it's working.
Signature lab
End-to-end secure agentic pipeline — push vulnerable AI code through and observe the defense-in-depth. The rollout blueprint is a required capstone deliverable.







.png)



Koushik M.
"Exceptional Hands-On Security Learning Platform"

Varunsainadh K.
"Practical Security Training with Real-World Labs"

Gaël Z.
"A new generation platform showing both attacks and remediations"

Nanak S.
"Best resource to learn for appsec and product security"



